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The Silence Penalty 
Jeffrey Bellin 
ABSTRACT: In every criminal trial, the defendant possesses the right to 
testify. Deciding whether to exercise that right, however, is rarely easy. 
Declining to testify shields defendants from questioning by the prosecutor and 
normally precludes the introduction of a defendant’s prior crimes. But silence 
comes at a price. Jurors penalize defendants who fail to testify by inferring 
guilt from silence. 
This Article explores this complex dynamic, focusing on empirical evidence 
from mock juror experiments—including the results of a new 400-person 
mock juror simulation conducted for this Article—and data from real trials. 
It concludes that the penalty defendants suffer when they refuse to testify is 
substantial, rivaling the more widely-recognized damage done to a 
defendant’s trial prospects by the introduction of a criminal record. Moreover, 
these two penalties work in tandem, creating a “parallel penalty” effect that 
systemically diminishes the prospects of acquittal and incentivizes guilty 
pleas.  
The empirical evidence surveyed, including the new juror simulation, will be 
of obvious interest to participants in the criminal justice system. But, as the 
Article explains, the data also present a powerful indictment of the system 
itself. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For much of American history, criminal defendants could not testify.1 In 
fact, it was only a quarter century ago that the Supreme Court swept away the 
last vestiges of the testimonial prohibition, belatedly recognizing a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional “right to take the witness stand.”2 To justify its 
atextual ruling, the Court channeled “the considered consensus of the 
English-speaking world” that there could be “no rational justification for 
prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused.”3 Legal commentators 
applauded. Despite regular appeals to historical intent and textual fidelity in 
other contexts, judges and academics across the ideological spectrum 
embrace the upstart constitutional right as an enlightened evolution, akin to 
the elimination of trial by ordeal.4 
 
 1. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971) (“[A]t the time of framing of the 
Fifth Amendment and for many years thereafter the accused in criminal cases was not allowed to 
testify in his own behalf . . . .”). 
 2. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987); cf. State v. McKenzie, 303 A.2d 406, 413 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (“The right to testify is not constitutional, but statutory.”). 
 3. Rock, 483 U.S. at 50 (quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961)). 
 4. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (explaining in a 9-0 decision that 
“[t]he right to testify on one’s own behalf in a criminal proceeding is . . . a right implicit in the 
Constitution”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is well 
established that the defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf, a right we have found 
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It was not always so. As reformers first ushered in an age of defendant 
testimony through statutes over a century ago, critics predicted dire 
consequences for the purported beneficiaries of the new right. Commenting 
on his state’s newly enacted statute in 1867, Massachusetts’ Supreme Court 
Justice Seth Ames argued that allowing defendant testimony would “destroy[] 
the presumption of innocence.”5 In light of jurors’ inevitably negative 
reaction to defendants who chose silence, Ames predicted defendants would 
have “practically no option at all”; the new right will “compel the defendant to 
testify” and “all will use it.”6 
Judge Ames was prescient in some respects and spectacularly wrong in 
others. In particular, his prediction that “all” defendants would testify did not 
come to pass. In modern times, only about half of criminal defendants take 
the witness stand.7 Notably, refusing to testify is not limited to guilty 
defendants. Around 40% of defendants later exonerated by DNA evidence 
declined to testify at their initial trials.8 As this figure indicates, defendants 
with important stories to tell frequently sit silently while their attorneys plead 
their case.9  
 
essential to our adversary system.”); Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 581–83 (collecting commentary from 
judges and academics); Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Why Strickland is the Wrong Test for 
Violations of the Right to Testify, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95, 147 (2013) (arguing for more robust 
protections of the right to testify, saying that “[w]e should simply speak of an independent ‘right 
to testify,’ an undisputed guarantee ‘implicit’ in the Due Process, Self-Incrimination, and 
Compulsory Process Clauses”); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian (!?) 
Analysis and A Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 666 (1991) (“[T]he right to testify in 
one’s own defense, although of far more recent vintage than some other rights of a criminal 
defendant, must now be considered as one of the most fundamental in our jurisprudence.” 
(footnote omitted)); Raymond J. McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal Defendant: It’s All About 
the Lawyer, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1575, 1642–43 (2012) (describing the right to testify as a “cherished 
constitutional right[]” that is “engrained in the fabric of the legal system”). 
 5. Testimony of Persons Accused of Crime, 1 AM. L. REV. 443, 444 (1867). For a comprehensive 
description of Judge Ames’s (and others’) objections and a discussion of the attribution of the 
quoted document to Ames, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 104 & n.31 (2003).  
 6. Testimony of Persons Accused of Crime, supra note 5, at 444, 446. 
 7. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect 
of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 
1373 tbl.2 (2009) (summarizing findings from the broad study of felony trials); Gordon Van 
Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 483 (1992) 
(“[I]nquiries with trial lawyers and judges lead me to believe that the extent of defendant refusals 
to testify is considerable—from one-third to well over one-half in some jurisdictions.”). 
 8. See infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing DNA-exoneration studies that 
reveal a high percentage of innocent defendants who declined to testify). 
 9. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 283–84 
(1978) (“It is one of the great peculiarities of modern Anglo-American procedure, on which 
Continental observers often remark, that we have so largely eliminated the accused as a testimonial 
resource.”); Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 575 (2014) 
(summarizing the negative consequences of silent defendants); Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from 
Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 707 (2014) (arguing that the American adversary system can 
“contribute to inaccuracy during trial” by “prevent[ing] the factfinder from hearing from the 
defendant, despite the fact that the defendant is probably the single most important source of 
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The remarkable prevalence of defendant trial silence can only be 
understood by reference to the consequences for those who do take the 
witness stand. While each case presents a variety of tactical considerations, the 
most concrete deterrent to testifying is a product of the evidence rules 
concerning prior crimes.10 In the modern era, most defendants who stand 
trial have a criminal record that predates the charged crime.11 This nation’s 
ongoing struggle with mass-incarceration suggests that the striking prevalence 
of trial defendants with prior convictions will only increase in the coming 
years.12 
American evidence rules generally exclude evidence of prior crimes.13 
But when defendants testify, their criminal record becomes eligible for 
admission as “impeachment.”14 Once a jury learns of a defendant’s record, it 
is more likely to convict—a phenomenon labeled here the “prior offender 
penalty.”15  For example, famed DNA exoneree Ronald Cotton testified at trial 
to his innocence of a violent break-in and rape.16 He was then impeached with 
his past crimes, including “a prior conviction of assault on a female with intent 
to commit rape and a prior conviction of breaking and entering.”17 After 
 
information about events relating to the offense”); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American 
Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 357 (1994) (arguing that even 
defendant testimony that includes lies provides useful information to juries); Van Kessel, supra note 
7, at 482 (criticizing legal rules that encourage defendants to remain silent, resulting in the “loss of 
evidence from the most important witness in the case”). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (reporting that 75% of suspects charged with a 
felony had a prior arrest, 60% had a prior felony arrest, 60% “had at least one prior conviction,” 
and 43% “had at least one prior felony conviction”). In the NCSC study of felony trials in four 
jurisdictions, 76% of the defendants standing trial had some kind of criminal record. Eisenberg 
& Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1. In another study of 201 Indianapolis jury trials between 1974 
and 1976, that author reported that “most defendants had prior convictions.” Martha A. Myers, 
Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 781, 790 (1979). Myers 
does not report the percentage, but instead provides an average of 2.7 prior convictions per 
defendant. Id. at 786 tbl. 1. Kalven and Zeisel reported that in 47% of the trials in their sample 
from 1954–1955, the defendant had a prior record. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 33 n.1, 145 (2d ed. 1971) (providing the dates of the survey and the percentage 
of defendants with a record). 
 12. See STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON?  
3–8, 51 tbl. 2.4 (2013) (presenting statistical analysis of the expanding incarcerated population 
over time and average time served). 
 13. See FED. R. EVID. 404; infra Part II.A. 
 14. See FED. R. EVID. 609; infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See Cynthia E. Jones, “I AM Ronald Cotton”: Teaching Wrongful Convictions in a Criminal 
Law Class, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 609, 609 n.1 (2013) (“The case of Ronald Cotton is probably 
the most famous DNA exoneration.”). 
 17. State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 458 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
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hearing of Cotton’s earlier convictions, the jury disbelieved his (truthful) 
claim of innocence and convicted.18   
Since the choice to testify belongs to the defendant alone, a common 
reaction to the looming admissibility of prior crimes is to decline to take the 
witness stand. The customary defense tactic of remaining silent to avoid 
impeachment (or other harms) creates a new risk, however.19 When 
defendants do not testify, they suffer a different penalty—labeled here the 
“silence penalty.” It is the interplay between the “silence penalty” and the 
“prior offender penalty” that typically determines whether defendants testify, 
and how jurors react to that choice.20 
The shaky historical pedigree and critical tactical importance of 
defendant testimony should make the topic a subject of spirited academic 
inquiry. Yet the literature is surprisingly thin. The legal and academic 
understanding of defendant testimony and trial silence has remained 
unchanged for decades. To the extent it is addressed at all, the modern 
discourse centers on a nebula of poorly-understood evidence doctrines and 
vacuous tactical folklore. As another commentator aptly summarized: “What 
has been largely missing from the debate are facts.”21 
This Article seeks to reanimate the academic discourse on defendant 
testimony and highlight its importance to current criminal justice debates. 
The analysis focuses on empirical evidence, a key element of any serious 
discussion in the increasingly polarized criminal justice space. The data come 
from three sources. First, the Article (Part II) synthesizes the pertinent social 
science literature which contains a wealth of informative, experimental mock 
juror studies often overlooked by legal commentators. Next, the Article (Part 
III) presents the results of a new, 400-person mock juror simulation designed 
to fill a significant gap in the existing body of experimental data. Third, the 
Article (Part IV) explores observational data from real trials, drawing 
primarily from the well-known, but perplexing22 multi-jurisdictional study of 
felony trials conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC). By 
 
 18. See id.  
 19. See infra Parts II.B, III.B and IV.B–D; cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 331 (1991) (describing defendants’ 
refusal to take the witness stand as “an everyday staple of trial practice”). 
 20. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (summarizing the findings of Part II).  
 21. John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 478 (2008); Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 
7, at 1356 (“Limited empirical analysis exists of defendants’ decisions to testify or of the effect of 
prior criminal records on trial outcomes in real jury trials.”); Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The 
Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 496 (2011) (arguing that “many judges and legal scholars have been 
largely indifferent to, or unaware of, the empirical evidence”). The three articles cited in this 
footnote are exceptions, analyzing empirical data on the impact of prior conviction 
impeachment. 
 22. See Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 493, 497 (noting the “seeming paradox” of the 
NCSC’s findings in this context). 
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tying together findings from the social science literature, the new mock jury 
simulation, and data from real trials, the Article is able to present (and 
support) a new, data-driven account of how jurors react to defendant 
testimony and its absence. 
Analysis of the data summarized above unlocks a variety of insights. 
Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the underappreciated power of trial 
silence. As explained below, the evidence suggests that, broadly speaking, the 
“silence penalty” harms defendants nearly as much as the more universally-
dreaded “prior offender penalty.” That is, a defendant who remains silent at 
trial suffers about the same damage to his acquittal prospects as a defendant 
who testifies and is “impeached” with a prior conviction. 
The implications of this “parallel penalty” thesis (explored in Part V) are 
powerful for defendants, their attorneys and anyone concerned with the 
fairness and accuracy of our criminal justice system.23 For defendants and 
their attorneys, the tactical implications are clear. The lesson of the data 
reported in this Article is that defense attorneys should not counsel trial 
silence lightly. Instead, they should seek to have their clients testify absent a 
strong case- or defendant-specific factor that dictates silence.24 A criminal 
record may present such a factor, but in many circumstances, even the 
disclosure of a criminal record will be less damaging than the 
underappreciated silence penalty. 
In a world where guilty pleas make up over 90% of convictions, trial 
tactics are only a part of the story.25 The real action in the criminal justice 
system happens pretrial and the parallel penalty dynamic operates there as 
well.26 The parallel penalties awaiting defendants with a criminal record at 
trial increase the pressure to forego trial and plead guilty. Defendants have 
only two trial options: testify or remain silent. If both options generate 
powerful penalties, guilty and innocent defendants will rationally bargain 
away an (illusory) presumption of innocence for a modicum of mercy. 
Finally, the empirical evidence presented in this Article vindicates the 
handful of 19th century critics who objected to allowing defendant testimony 
in the first place. The critics’ reasoning does not map perfectly onto modern 
times, but the spirit of their critique rings true. For most defendants, 
including those with prior convictions and those who decline to testify, the 
right to testify probably does more harm than good.27 Distressingly, the data 
further suggest that this harm stems from juror assumptions about both 
 
 23. See infra Part V.A. 
 24. See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 26. See infra Part V.D. 
 27. See infra Part V.D. 
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defendant silence and prior convictions that, as far as the law is concerned, 
have no place in a criminal trial.28 
II. DECIDING WHETHER TO TESTIFY OR REMAIN SILENT 
Judge Ames’ forecast that “all” criminal defendants would testify falls flat 
in the modern era. But Ames was right that for many defendants the privilege 
to testify is more curse than blessing. As we will see, for most defendants the 
choice between testifying or remaining silent is an exercise in damage 
control.29 This Part isolates and analyzes the two options, with a particular 
focus on experimental evidence from the social science literature. 
A. THE PRIOR OFFENDER PENALTY 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo famously stated that “character is never an 
issue in a criminal prosecution unless the defendant chooses to make it one”; 
as far as the law is concerned, “a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands 
before a jury, a prisoner at the bar.”30 Unfortunately, Cardozo’s flowery 
sentiment only applies to silent defendants. When a defendant testifies, he 
becomes subject to cross-examination just like any other witness. The 
defendant-witness is “duty-bound to speak truthfully, entitled to the same 
privileges, and exposed to the same perils of impeachment, stress, 
embarrassment, and so on.”31 
One longstanding method of impugning a witness’s sincerity is cross-
examination regarding past crimes.32 Oliver Wendell Holmes explained the 
operative logic in 1884: A prior violation of the law indicates a “general 
readiness to do evil” and “from that general disposition” the jury may “infer a 
readiness to lie in the particular case.”33 As the evidence is admissible only 
with respect to the “witness’s character for truthfulness,”34 judges must 
instruct juries that the testifying defendant’s “prior convictions should only 
be used to judge [the defendant’s] credibility rather than his propensity to 
 
 28. See infra Part V.B. 
 29. Cf. F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, 2 CRIMINAL TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 44:1 (2d ed. 
2017) (discussing the decision to testify and negative jury reactions from a defendant’s choice 
not to testify). 
 30. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930); cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 
U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (discussing how the law generally ignores the defendant’s character).  
 31. See Capra & Tartakovsky, supra note 4, at 155. 
 32. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), 609. Before laws permitting defendant testimony, 
defendants “rarely had to fear that their past convictions could become evidence against them.” 
FISHER, supra note 5, at 105. 
 33. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (“The evidence has no tendency to 
prove that [the witness] was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that 
conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.”). 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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commit crimes.”35 When combined with the defendant’s right to testify, this 
evidentiary framework generates a peculiarity of the American trial system: 
The admissibility of a defendant’s criminal record typically depends on the 
defendant’s decision whether or not to take the witness stand. If the 
defendant testifies, his record will generally be admitted.36 If the defendant 
does not testify, it generally will be excluded.37 
Social scientists have produced a valuable body of experimental research 
regarding the impact of prior convictions. This research reveals that “[j]urors 
are more likely to convict an accused if they receive information about 
previous convictions than if they do not.”38 That is no surprise. Admissible 
 
 35. United States v. Richardson, 515 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2008) (highlighting trial court’s 
instruction to “only consider these prior convictions for purposes of assessing [the defendant’s] 
credibility”); United States v. Stanley, 94 F. App’x 984, 986 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 36. See KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 147 (reporting that the jury hears about the 
defendant’s record in 72% of the cases when defendant takes the stand and in 13% of the cases 
when the defendant does not); Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened 
the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 330 
(2008) (tracing doctrinal developments that led state and federal courts to “routinely permit 
prior conviction impeachment of criminal defendants”); Blume, supra note 21, at 490 (reporting 
that in survey of exonerated defendants, “[i]n every single case in which a defendant with a prior 
record testified, the trial court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his or 
her prior convictions”). Eisenberg and Hans report that the NCSC data show only about half of 
the defendants with prior records who testified were impeached with their prior records and 
conclude that “the results suggest that judges, as evidentiary rules require, balance the relevance 
of a prior criminal record with the possible prejudice to the defendant.” Eisenberg & Hans, supra 
note 7, at 1373. A more likely explanation is that some of what constituted a “prior record” for 
the NCSC data did not qualify as impeachment. See infra Part III.A (describing limitations in 
NCSC prior record data). 
 37. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); 
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1375 tbl.4 (reporting that in only 12 out of 137 cases in which 
defendants with prior convictions did not testify were the convictions were revealed). 
 38. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 
PROCEDURE 124, 131 (Saul M. Kassim & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); see also A. N. Doob 
& H. M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon 
an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 95 (1972) (concluding form mock juror study that jurors learning 
of prior conviction increased likelihood of conviction and that judicial “instructions to disregard 
the evidence will not counteract the damaging ‘halo’ effect of the previous convictions”); 
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1358 (“Most of the experimental studies show that knowledge 
of a defendant’s criminal record has statistically significant biasing effects on jurors’ guilt 
perceptions and verdicts.”); Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on 
Juror Decision Making, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 71–73 (1995) (summarizing mock juror study 
that revealed that likelihood of conviction increased from 17% to 40% when jurors told about 
prior burglary conviction in bank robbery trial); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 
of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 243 (1976) 
(summarizing mock juror studies that found that jurors were more likely to convict in burglary 
case when told of prior burglary conviction and concluding that “[p]resence of record, then, 
appears to reliably increase the probability that a defendant will be found guilty by a jury, 
regardless of the evidence”); Kathryn Stanchi & Deirdre Bowen, This Is Your Sword: How Damaging 
Are Prior Convictions to Plaintiffs in Civil Trials?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 901, 911 (2014) (“Most studies 
show that admission of a defendant’s prior conviction leads to more guilty verdicts in criminal 
trials, regardless of whether the jurors receive a limiting instruction.”). 
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evidence generally damages one side or the other. Credibility impeachment 
with prior convictions should be no exception. Yet the research suggests that 
prior conviction impeachment does not operate as the law intends. Rather 
than relying on prior convictions as evidence of the defendant-as-witness’s 
character for truthfulness, jurors appear to rely on convictions as forbidden 
criminal propensity evidence—“generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act 
into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad 
act now charged.”39 
If jurors used prior convictions as the law intends, past crimes that 
undermined the defendant’s truthful character, such as perjury, would be the 
most damaging to defendants’ chances of acquittal. Yet empirical research has 
shown that even when properly instructed, mock jurors convict most readily 
when presented with prior crimes that are similar to the charged crime, not, 
as the operating legal theory would predict, when presented with crimes 
related to dishonesty.40 The stronger salience of similar crimes as opposed to 
dishonesty crimes in generating guilty verdicts suggests that jurors use prior 
convictions to engage in legally forbidden criminal propensity reasoning. 
A widely-cited study by Roselle Wissler and Michael Saks presented mock 
jurors with scenarios that included prior convictions for the same crime and 
prior convictions for perjury.41 The mock jurors were instructed on the proper 
use of the prior convictions through a variant of the standard instruction used 
in Massachusetts trials.42 Jurors in a mock murder case convicted 70% of the 
time when the defendant had a prior murder conviction, but only 50% of the 
time when the defendant had a prior perjury conviction.43 Other jurors given 
a mock auto theft case convicted 80% of the time when the defendant had a 
prior auto theft conviction, but only 70% of the time when the defendant had 
a perjury conviction.44 These results suggest that the mock jurors relied on 
the prior convictions as evidence of the defendant’s criminal propensities, not 
solely as impeachment.  
The Wissler and Saks study, while extensively cited, suffers from some 
weaknesses. It relies on a relatively small sample size and its most powerful 
finding arises from an unusual scenario of a defendant with a prior murder 
conviction.45 Nevertheless, other researchers have reported the same result in 
 
 39. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). 
 40. Shaffer, supra note 38 (“[S]everal investigators have found the evidence of a prior 
record influences jurors’ verdicts without affecting their assessments of the defendant’s 
credibility as a witness.”). 
 41. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors 
Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 39 (1985). 
 42. Id. at 40 & n.5. 
 43. Id. at 43 tbl.2. 
 44. Id.  
 45. The study reports findings from 20 subjects per condition. Id. at 39–40 (160 persons 
assigned to 8 distinct conditions). 
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similarly constructed mock juror studies.46 One portion of the new mock jury 
simulation presented in Part III tested for the same phenomenon, using a 
larger sample size and more typical crimes. Shoring up the findings 
referenced above, the mock juror simulation obtains similar results. The 
jurors in the simulation convicted more often when the defendant was 
impeached with a prior similar crime (82%) than when he was impeached 
with a dissimilar dishonesty crime (73%).47 
Another social science study reviewed comments made by mock jurors 
during deliberations. It found that juror statements about prior convictions 
“tended not to center around the credibility issue” but instead “juries were 
more likely to discuss a prior conviction (particularly one for a similar crime) 
as a basis for inferring that the defendant is the type of person who is capable 
of committing the current offense.”48 Data from real trials points to the same 
conclusion. Analyzing data gathered from post-trial surveys with actual jurors, 
Valerie Hans and Theodore Eisenberg found that jurors’ self-reported 
assessments of the defendant’s credibility did not correlate with the admission 
of prior convictions.49 This suggests that real jurors are unimpressed with the 
legally sanctioned purpose for the admission of prior convictions. 
Courts themselves acknowledge the danger that jurors will be unable to 
separate the proper from improper use of prior crimes evidence. The 
standard framework for assessing the admissibility of prior convictions as 
impeachment requires judges to consider, inter alia, “[t]he similarity between 
the past crime and the charged crime.”50 The introduction of similar crimes, 
the courts recognize, generates “inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe 
that ‘if he did it before he probably did so this time.’”51 Although judges 
routinely admit prior convictions offered as impeachment, even for similar 
 
 46. See E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Another Look at the Impact of Juror Sentiments Toward 
Defendants on Juridic Decisions, 125 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 637, 645 (1985) (finding that mock juries 
convicted markedly more often in an armed robbery case if the defendant had a prior robbery 
conviction than if he had a prior conviction for counterfeiting); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects 
on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. 
L.R., 734, 744 (summarizing results of mock juror study: “[a] recent similar conviction produces 
the most guilty verdicts”).  
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
 48. Clary and Shaffer, supra note 46; Shaffer, supra note 38. 
 49. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1387 (relying on juror credibility ratings to conclude, 
“we do not find evidence that criminal records affect defendant credibility. . . . In cases in which 
defendants testified, criminal record was not significantly associated with the degree of 
believability.”). 
 50. United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Bellin, supra note 
36, at 313 (describing the Mahone-based framework courts utilize for evaluating the admissibility 
of prior convictions). 
 51. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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crimes,52 their recognition of this consideration stands as official 
acknowledgement of the difficulty jurors face in resisting the prohibited 
“criminal character” inference. 
The academic literature includes one contrary claim that must be 
addressed. Two of the most prominent scholars to address prior convictions 
in recent years, Larry Laudan and Ronald Allen, argue that the empirical 
evidence regarding “how mock jurors handle prior crimes information” is “all 
over the map” and “contradictory.”53 They assert that a judge who believed 
that “prior crimes evidence has only a very limited effect on jury decisions” 
would find “plenty of studies to back up that prior disposition.”54 Laudan and 
Allen recognize that their claim runs counter to the (“clumsily cobbled 
together”) “conventional wisdom,” the views of academics, judges and 
“American evidence law.”55 Nevertheless, the prominence of these authors 
and the forcefulness of their assertion makes it necessary to examine their 
contention in some detail. 
Laudan and Allen identify five studies that support the consensus 
described above—that when jurors learn of the defendant’s prior convictions, 
acquittal prospects drop.56 To make out the claim that the empirical evidence 
is nonetheless “all over the map,” Laudan and Allen cite four other studies 
that they believe point in the other direction.57 The four studies do not 
support Laudan and Allen’s contention. Three of the studies are easily 
dispensed with on the ground that they do not consider prior conviction 
evidence at all. Instead, in all three studies mock jurors learned that the 
defendant had made incriminating (or exculpatory) statements.58 The jurors 
were then instructed to disregard the statements because they were obtained 
 
 52. See supra note 36 (identifying sources); see also Bellin, supra note 36, at 322–35 (citing 
examples and highlighting pro-admission bias of five-factor framework that governs admissibility 
of prior conviction impeachment). 
 53. Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 500–01 (describing “congeries of conflicting results”). 
 54. Id. at 501. 
 55. Id. at 494–96 (arguing that the “conventional wisdom” along with “aspects of American 
evidence law—and considerable American evidence scholarship” is all erroneously based on a 
“widely-shared set of beliefs” including that “[t]elling jurors about the prior crimes of a defendant 
dramatically increases their disposition to convict”). 
 56. Id. at 500–01 (identifying Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 38; Greene & Dodge, supra 
note 38; Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 46); Hans & Doob, supra note 38; Wissler & Saks, supra note 41. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Bruce Rind et al., Effect of Crime Seriousness on Simulated Jurors’ Use of Inadmissible Evidence, 
135 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 419 (1995) (testing jurors’ ability to ignore “incriminating wire tap 
evidence”); William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 456 (1981) (testing jurors’ ability to disregard a “tape recording of a 
conversation between the defendant and [a] bookmaker”); see also Thomas R. Carretta & Richard 
L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 
295 (1983) (testing jurors’ ability to disregard “a taped telephone conversation” involving, again, 
a bookmaker—in this example, the wiretap was not illegal, but the evidence was deemed 
inadmissible because the defendant was not the target of the wiretap). 
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through an illegal wiretap.59 These studies may be pertinent to the broader 
issue of jury instructions, but they concern a different species of evidence and 
altogether different considerations (e.g., police misconduct).60 
Only one of the four studies Laudan and Allen cite for the proposition 
that the evidence on “how mock jurors handle prior crimes information” is 
“all over the map” concerns prior crimes. But the portion of that 40-year-old 
London61 study that supports Lauden and Allen’s contention is easily 
distinguished. The study presented a simulated rape trial of two co-
defendants, and noted that mock jurors convicted at similar rates whether or 
not they heard about one of the co-defendant’s prior rape conviction. 
Importantly, the study’s authors introduced the prior conviction in an 
unusual manner. In real trials and in most simulations, prior crimes are 
introduced through unassailable sources such as an official record or the 
defendant’s own admission. Judges then instruct jurors to use the conviction 
only as impeachment, validating its accuracy. In the London study, however, 
the conviction was “let slip” in the other co-defendant’s testimony—and then 
the judge instructed the jurors to disregard it completely.62 This confounds 
the analysis. Jurors in the London study might have resisted the normal 
impact of prior convictions because they disbelieved the co-defendant’s 
offhand assertion that his accomplice had previously committed a rape—
particularly as each defendant stood to benefit by casting blame on each 
other.63 
In sum, the prior conviction finding cited by Laudan and Allen that 
counters the broad consensus on prior crimes evidence can be explained as 
stemming from an atypical study design. The empirical evidence from mock 
juror experiments is one-sided and clear. The studies suggest that the 
introduction of prior conviction evidence substantially damages defendants’ 
chances for acquittal, primarily through a legally prohibited “criminal 
propensity” inference.64  
 
 59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 60. Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 500–01 (incorrectly describing the Thompson et al. 
study as concerning “inadmissible priors evidence,” Rind et al. study as concerning “prior crimes 
information,” and Carretta and Moreland study as finding similar results in two groups, one told 
about prior crimes and the other not). 
 61. L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 210 (1973) 
(noting that solicitations to participate were mailed to “government and commercial offices in 
central London”). 
 62. Id. at 212–13; cf. Rind et al., supra note 58, at 418 (cautioning about generalization of 
the Sealy and Cornish’s findings because “many factors in addition to seriousness differed 
between the theft and rape cases”). 
 63. L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 61, at 218. 
 64. MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EVIDENCE LAW 168 (Linda J. Demaine ed., 2016) (“The available empirical evidence is 
unanimous in finding that, notwithstanding judicial instructions to the contrary, most people 
travel the forbidden path of using prior crimes evidence to make substantive inferences about 
the likelihood that the testifying defendant committed the current crime charged.”). 
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B. THE SILENCE PENALTY 
The preceding section analyzed experimental evidence that illustrates 
the harm done to a defendant’s acquittal prospects when the jury learns of a 
prior conviction. To avoid this “prior offender penalty,” defendants can, and 
often do, choose to remain silent at trial.65 As one defense attorney manual 
explains, when it comes to defendant testimony, “[o]ftentimes . . . silence is 
golden. The client may be better off saying nothing and merely giving the 
appearance of a choir boy.”66 Yet, as this section reveals, the empirical 
evidence also demonstrates that remaining silent comes at a price.  
There is little doubt that jurors view defendants’ silence with a cynical 
eye. A juror interview for the “Serial” podcast, a popular investigative series 
about a controversial murder conviction, illustrates the problem defendants 
face: 
Reporter: “Did it bother you guys as a jury that [the defendant] 
Adnan [Syed] himself didn’t testify, didn’t take the stand?” 
Juror: “[Y]eah, that was huge. We all kinda like gasped . . . we were 
all just blown away by that. You know, why not, if you’re a defendant, 
why would you not get up there and defend yourself, and try to prove 
that the State is wrong, that you weren’t there, that you’re not guilty? 
We were trying to be so open minded, it was just like, get up there 
and say something, try to persuade, even though it’s not your job to 
persuade us . . . .”67 
The sentiment is not unusual. In public opinion surveys, about half of 
respondents say that a defendant who does not testify “is probably guilty” or 
“has something to hide.”68  
 
 65. See infra Part III.B. 
 66. See 1A CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 24A.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2017); cf. BAILEY 
& FISHMAN, supra note 29 (noting that “classically it was thought that a defendant should avoid 
testifying unless absolutely necessary”).  
 67. See Serial Podcast, Episode 8: The Deal with Jay, GENIUS, http://genius.com/Serial-
podcast-episode-8-the-deal-with-jay-annotated (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).  
 68. Fox News/Opinions Dynamics Poll (Feb. 2002) (survey of 900 registered voters by 
telephone, asking, “[w]hen someone cites his or her Fifth Amendment right in refusing to testify, 
do you generally think the person is probably guilty [50%], or the person is simply exercising a 
right [36%]?”); Decision Quest, Fair Juror Survey (Sept. 1999) (survey of 1,000 people by 
telephone, asking, “[w]hen a defendant in a criminal case does not testify it means he or she 
probably has something to hide [50%] or it does not mean he or she has something to hide 
[38%]”); Gallup Poll (Apr. 1957) (personal interviews of 1,654 people, asking, “[w]hen you hear 
of a person using the fifth amendment, do you generally think he is guilty [48%], or not 
[16%]?”). The balance of each percentage break down consists of “I don’t know” or “No 
opinion.” All of the polls cited above were located using iPoll. Cornell Univ., Search U.S. Questions 
with iPoll, ROPERCENTER, https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database (last visited Oct. 15, 
2017) (finding Fox News poll using ID “USODFOX.021402.R11”; Decision Quest poll with ID 
“USBRUSKN.99JURY.R03A”; and Gallup Poll with ID “USGALLUP.57-581.Q035”). Thanks to 
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Table 1: 2002 Public Opinion Poll69 
 
When a person invokes his or her 
5th Amendment right not to testify, 
the person is . . . 
Probably Guilty 50% 
Simply Exercising a Right 36% 
Not Sure 14% 
 
The apparently widespread belief that an innocent defendant would testify 
looms ominously over jury deliberations involving silent defendants.  
The social science literature, and particularly research by psychology 
professor David R. Shaffer, supports the conclusion that jurors punish 
defendants for refusing to testify. Consistent with that of other researchers, 
Shaffer’s research reveals that mock jurors convict more readily when 
defendants appear to be withholding information.70 In one study, a group of 
mock jurors were told that a defendant, after testifying on direct, invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself in response to a 
question on cross-examination.71 These jurors convicted significantly more 
frequently.72 The study concludes that, “the defendant who gives the 
appearance of withholding crime-relevant information is likely to be viewed 
guilty and deserving of conviction.”73  
Shaffer suspected that jurors would be less punitive when the defendant’s 
refusal to answer questions took the form of the invocation of the venerated 
Fifth Amendment right not to take the witness stand.74 With a co-author, he 
staged a sophisticated trial simulation where jurors were presented with 
either: (1) a defendant who did not testify; (2) a defendant who testified, but 
refused to answer a potentially incriminating question during cross-
examination; or (3) a defendant who testified normally without refusing to 
answer any questions.75 The jurors were instructed, as applicable, that they 
could not hold the defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against him.76 This time, Shaffer uncovered even more compelling evidence 
 
John Blume for the inspiration to search iPoll and the citation to the Fox News poll. See Blume, 
supra note 21, at n.1. 
 69.  Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, supra note 68. 
 70. See generally David R. Shaffer & Thomas Case, On the Decision to Testify in One’s Own Behalf: 
Effects of Withheld Evidence, Defendant’s Sexual Preferences, and Juror Dogmatism on Juridic Decisions, 42 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 335 (1982); Shaffer, supra note 38. 
 71. E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Effects of Evidence Withholding and a Defendant’s Prior Record 
on Juridic Decisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 242 (1980). 
 72. Id. at 243. 
 73. Id. at 245; cf. Hans & Doob, supra note 38, at 245 (noting that, in another study, the 
“presence of record increased the salience of the negative evidence against the defendant”). 
 74. Shaffer & Case, supra note 70, at 336. 
 75. Id. at 339. 
 76. Id. 
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of a silence penalty. Two thirds of the juries that rendered verdicts in the 
scenarios where the defendant withheld information (either by declining to 
testify or refusing to answer a specific question) rendered a guilty verdict.77 By 
contrast, there were no guilty verdicts in the scenarios where the defendant 
did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.78 Individual juror votes among 
the juries that could not reach a verdict followed the same pattern.79 
Importantly, Shaffer found his surmise that jurors might respect the 
defendant’s choice not to testify at all (as opposed to testifying selectively) 
disproven. “[A]nalyses of the group verdicts, guilt ratings, and the verdicts of 
individual jurors revealed that defendants who declined to take the stand were 
judged just as harshly as their counterparts who refused to answer specific 
interrogation.”80  
Another window into the impact of defendant silence comes from post-
conviction case law. The law is stacked against challenges to juror verdicts as 
evidenced by legal doctrine that verdicts cannot be impeached by juror 
testimony regarding the content of their deliberations.81 This bar generally 
extends to “proof that one or more jurors held it against the accused that he 
failed to take the stand.”82 Still, challenges abound.83 A recent California case 
 
 77. Id. at 341. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 342. 
 80. Id. at 344. 
 81. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 606. 
 82. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:17, at 81 
(3d ed. 2007) (“Despite the constitutional right not to testify . . . the Rule bars proof that one or 
more jurors held it against the accused that he failed to take the stand.”). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 998 (7th Cir. 2014) (“join[ing] 
every other circuit court to consider the issue” in holding that juror statements about considering 
the defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used to impeach a verdict under Rule 606(b) and 
citing cases from the 3d, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits); United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 
817, 831 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim for new trial based on juror statement to press that, 
“[i]f [the defendants] were innocent, they would have testified”); United States v. Rutherford, 
371 F.3d 634, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Pendergast v. Newland, 29 F. App’x 459, 463 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Rodriquez, 116 F.3d 1225, 1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); 
United States v. Tran, 122 F.3d 670, 673 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Martinez-
Moncivais, 14 F.3d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting challenge based on fact that “one of 
the jurors stated in a post-trial affidavit that two other jurors suggested that if the defendant had 
been innocent he would have taken the stand in his own defense”); United States v. Friedland, 
660 F.2d 919, 927–28 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Coleman v. Sisto, No. 2:09–cv–0020, 2012 WL 
6020095, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (same); Rowland v. Chappell, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 
1335 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same); United States v. Stewart, No. 4:07CR–10–M, 2008 WL 2038897, 
at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 12, 2008) (same); United States v. Hollingsworthmata, 72 M.J. 619, 622–23 
(A. Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (discussing Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) and concluding the same); 
see also United States v. Stewart, No. 91–00070, 1994 WL 547811, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1994) 
(rejecting allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to seek new 
conviction based on juror’s statement that defendant’s failure to testify demonstrated his guilt); 
United States v. Edwards, 486 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting claim for new trial 
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illustrates the genre. In Strand v. McDonald, a juror testified that the 
“defendant’s failure to testify was mentioned between six and twelve times 
during jury deliberations, by as many as half of the jurors. About one-quarter 
to one-third of the remarks included the view that ‘if [defendant] was 
innocent he would have testified.’”84 (Both the federal and state courts upheld 
the verdict.)85 Given the futility of these claims and the likely reluctance of 
jurors to broadcast their own malfeasance, the number of cases that raise the 
issue86 hints at an underlying reservoir of cases where jurors considered the 
defendant’s failure to testify as evidence of guilt. 
The anecdotal and empirical evidence summarized above suggests that 
just as there is a significant “prior offender penalty,” there is also a powerful 
“silence penalty.” Although, as Shaffer notes, “how heavily” the silence penalty 
“weighs” remains an open question.87 The next Parts attempt to answer that 
question by analyzing the results of a new mock juror simulation and data 
from real trials. 
III. COMPARING THE PARALLEL PENALTIES: A MOCK JUROR EXPERIMENT 
The mock juror studies summarized in Part II suggest that (1) jurors will 
convict more readily when they learn that a defendant has a prior criminal 
record; and (2) jurors will penalize defendants who do not testify. Yet the 
literature has a blind spot. Despite a bounty of mock juror studies, no previous 
study compares the effect of the introduction of a prior conviction against the 
effect of a failure to testify—the dilemma typically faced by criminal 
defendants. This Part presents the results of a trial simulation involving 400 
mock jurors designed to do just that. As explained below, the simulation 
detected both a “silence penalty” and a “prior offender penalty.” Most 
interestingly, the simulation found the penalties to be roughly equal. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The mock juror experiment consisted of a simulated trial of a single 
defendant for breaking into a store and stealing jewelry. The simulation was 
designed—and pilot tested—to suggest guilt, but not conclusively. The goal 
was to construct a straightforward, realistic case that was close enough to 
engender disagreement, but still representative of a typical American criminal 
 
based on anonymous phone call alleging “that the jury deliberations were in large measure 
focused on discussions concerning Mr. Edwards’ failure to testify”). 
 84. Strand v. McDonald, No. 2:12–cv–1237, 2013 WL 5755059, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 
2013) (alteration in original). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. See supra note 83 (collecting cases). 
 87. Shaffer, supra note 38, at 145. 
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trial.88 (For example, in California the rate of conviction at trial in felony cases 
is reportedly higher than 80%; in Florida it is around 73%.)89  
I recruited mock jurors using the Mechanical Turk employment 
marketplace. Researchers increasingly rely on Mechanical Turk for academic 
studies since it facilitates access to a broad range of willing research 
participants in a cost-and-time effective manner.90 As with jury service, 
Mechanical Turk users must be at least 18 years of age;91 eligibility was further 
limited to people located in the United States. A number of studies indicate 
that Mechanical Turk respondents are preferable in terms of 
representativeness and diligence to typical academic survey subjects.92 
Mechanical Turk respondents, however, can skew younger, more female and 
more educated than the population at large. This would be problematic in a 
public opinion survey, but here we are looking at reactions to subtly-altered 
fact patterns distributed randomly to subsets of the survey group. It seems 
unlikely in this context that any potential differences between a Mechanical 
Turk sample and a typical jury pool would warp the results. In short, 
Mechanical Turk, like other survey tools, is not perfect, but in experiments 
such as this, can be “a reliable source of experimental data in judgment and 
decision-making.”93 
 
 88. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1386 (theorizing that the effect of a criminal 
record “occurs primarily in cases in which the evidence is not overwhelming” and noting that this 
“resonates with Kalven and Zeisel’s classic finding that extralegal factors have the most impact 
primarily in close, as opposed to clear, cases”). 
 89. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2013 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 
2002–2003 THROUGH 2011–2012, at 47 fig.35 (2013), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2013-
Court-Statistics-Report.pdf; Trial Courts Statistics, Florida Courts,  http://trialstats.flcourts.org/ 
TrialCourtStats.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (reporting state-wide 73% rate for convictions after 
jury trial for 2015, excluding cases resolved by plea); see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking 
the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (1993) (“Felony conviction rates after trial are around eighty 
percent . . . .”); Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 501–02 (criticizing mock juror studies for relying on 
cases that present “ambiguous and non-decisive” evidence and noting “that most real criminal cases are 
not borderline cases”); Neil Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury, 80 JUDICATURE 286,  
288–89 (1997) (surveying jury conviction rates). 
 90. See Christopher T. Robertson et al., Perceptions of Efficacy, Morality, and Politics of Potential 
Cadaveric Organ-Transplantation Reforms, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 108 n.30 (2014) (“Mturk, 
a human-subject population . . . is increasingly utilized for social science research.”). 
 91. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012) (federal jury service qualifications). 
 92. See Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1342 
n.48 (2014) (explaining that “[m]ultiple studies have validated results using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk on a variety of assessments, especially when compared to samples of 
convenience” and citing numerous studies); Danielle N. Shapiro et al., Using Mechanical Turk to 
Study Clinical Populations, 1 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 214 (2012) (“Cross-sample investigations 
comparing MTurk to other methods of data collection have demonstrated that data obtained 
from its workers are similar to data collected from more traditional subject pools (e.g., college 
undergraduates or community samples derived from college towns) in a variety of research 
domains, including . . . basic biases in decision making.” (citation omitted)). 
 93. Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT  
& DECISION MAKING 411, 416 (2010); see sources cited in supra notes 90–92. 
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Four hundred participants agreed to take the survey in exchange for a 
nominal fee approximating the (pro-rated) federal minimum wage.94 
Respondents were routed to an automated, online survey interface that 
randomly presented one of four case scenarios.95 The scenarios were identical 
except with respect to whether the defendant testified and, if so, the type of 
impeachment presented. Respondents who encountered impeachment also 
received a jury instruction that the prior crime could be considered “only with 
respect to [the defendant’s] credibility.”96  In the scenarios where the 
defendant testified, his testimony added no new information. The 
defendant’s testimony was summarily described as being “consistent with that 
of” a defense alibi witness whose testimony (that he and the defendant were 
watching a baseball game at the time of the crime) appeared in all four 
scenarios. 





The defendant did not testify; no prior 
convictions introduced. 
Scenario 2 
The defendant testified and was not impeached 
with any prior convictions. 
Scenario 3 
The defendant testified and was impeached 
with a “criminal fraud” conviction. 
Scenario 4 
The defendant testified and was impeached 
with a “robbery” conviction. 
 
 
 94. After pilot testing established a rough estimate of how long the survey took, I established 
a payment rate that translated to a little more than the federal and Virginia minimum wage. This 
rate is high by Mechanical Turk standards, and resulted in an almost immediate acceptance of 
the survey by the maximum number of respondents—something that likely assisted with 
obtaining a random sample. Payment of minimum wage is not standard even for academic 
requesters. See Shapiro et al., supra note 92 (describing the $2.25 per hour pay provided as “above 
average for MTurk”); Jill D. Weinberg et al., Comparing Data Characteristics and Results of an Online 
Factorial Survey Between a Population-Based and a Crowdsource-Recruited Sample, 1 SOC. SCI. 292, 298 
(2014) (describing $3 per hour pay provided as “relatively high by MT standards”). For quality 
control purposes, users could not have more than a 5% failure rate on previous Mechanical Turk 
tasks. Weinberg et al., supra (same qualification). Open-ended comments at the conclusion of 
the survey indicated that the respondents enjoyed the survey experience and took it seriously.  
 95. This is a common process that delivers the data directly to the researcher, rather than 
leaving it on the Mechanical Turk survey platform. See Weinberg et al., supra note 94. 
 96. Qualtrics Survey Software, Survey Preview, California v. Ronald Willis 5 (Aug. 25, 2015) 
(survey print preview on file with author). The instruction paralleled the standard jury instruction in 
this context. See United States v. Stanley, 94 F. App’x 984, 986 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[P]rior convictions 
should only be used to judge . . . credibility rather than . . . propensity to commit crimes.”). 
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Respondents answered a series of “reading check” questions to ensure 
that they were, in fact, reading and understanding their respective scenarios.97 
At the conclusion of the presentation, the survey instructed respondents that 
“you should only find the defendant guilty if you believe the evidence 
establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Participants were then asked 
how they would vote “as a juror in a criminal case: not guilty or guilty.” 
B. RESULTS 
Jurors voted to convict in 73% of the cases. The following table reveals 






Testifies? Impeachment Number (n) Scenario Guilty 
Yes Robbery 100 4 82% 
No None 96 1 76% 
Yes Criminal Fraud 100 3 73% 
Yes None 97 2 62% 
 
Approximately 100 distinct mock jurors voted in each scenario. As the 
above table shows, the conviction rate was highest for Scenario 4 where the 
defendant testified and was impeached with a prior robbery. The lowest 
conviction rate occurred in Scenario 2 where the defendant testified and was 
not impeached with any prior crimes. The other two scenarios—where the 
defendant did not testify, or testified and was impeached with a criminal fraud 
conviction—returned similar conviction rates. 
The results are consistent with the social science literature presented in 
Part II. The jury’s learning of prior convictions negatively impacted the 
defendant’s chances for acquittal. The jurors convicted most often (82%) 
when they learned that the defendant had a prior robbery conviction. The 
conviction rate was also elevated (73%) over the no record condition (62%) 
when the defendant was impeached with a “criminal fraud” conviction. 
Overall, jurors voted to convict 78% of the time in the two prior conviction 
conditions, but only 62% of the time when the same testifying defendant was 
 
 97. Again, this is common practice. See Weinberg et al., supra note 94, at 294 
(“[R]esearchers routinely embed ‘comprehension checks’ in surveys . . . .”). Seven of the 400 
respondents (1.75%) were excluded from the final tally for failing to demonstrate minimal 
comprehension of the factual scenario; the disqualification threshold was established in advance. 
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not impeached with any prior crimes. This variance achieves statistical 
significance.98 
These findings also support the critique developed in Part II that prior 
conviction impeachment does not operate in the manner that the law 
contemplates. If prior conviction impeachment speaks only to the 
defendant’s character for truthfulness, crimes of dishonesty would be most 
damaging. Here, the fraud conviction should have been most damaging since 
it is a crime that, unlike robbery, speaks directly to truthful character. 
“Criminal fraud” is one of a handful of offenses specifically referenced in the 
legislative history to Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and its advisory committee 
notes as directly “bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.”99 
Instead, in this experiment, the robbery conviction—an offense that was likely 
seen by lay participants as similar to the charged jewelry store burglary—had 
a larger negative impact. This suggests (consistent with the prior research 
discussed in Part II.A) that jurors indulged a forbidden, criminal propensity 
inference.  
Finally, and most interestingly, the results support the “parallel penalty” 
hypothesis developed in the preceding sections. Consistent with Shaffer’s 
research described in Part II.B, the results reveal a clear “silence penalty.” 
Respondents convicted 76% of the defendants who remained silent, but only 
62% of equally situated defendants who testified (but added no facts).100 
 
 98. Significant at p <0.05 and p <0.01 with two-tailed hypothesis. To test for statistical significance, 
I used a Z-test for two population proportions, following ROBERT A. HANNEMAN ET AL., BASIC STATISTICS 
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 294–96 (2013), and confirmed my calculations with an online statistical 
significance calculator available at the “Social Science Statistics” web site. Z Score Calculator for 2 
Population Proportions, SOCIAL SCIENCE STATISTICS, http://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/ztest/ 
Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). I report the statistical significance only for skeptics. The 
experiment is sufficiently intuitive that the reported percentages speak for themselves. Like most 
experimental results, however, they are powerful only in the context of the other supporting evidence 
reported throughout this paper. See D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 1333, 1344–45 (1986) (“There is no strictly objective basis, in science or in anything else, for 
believing that a proposition is true simply because the evidence for it is ‘statistically significant’ at the 
.05 level.”). 
 99. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 amendment (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 93-1597, at 9 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)) (providing a list of such crimes). 
 100. The fact scenario informed the mock jurors that the defendant is not required to testify, 
but did not specifically instruct them to disregard his decision not to. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 
U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (requiring such an instruction “when requested by a defendant”). In theory, 
such an instruction could have mitigated the damage. The evidence is, however, to the contrary. 
See Blume, supra note 21, at 488 (“The jury is likely to disregard an instruction that this inference 
[of guilt from silence] is not permissible.”); Shaffer, supra note 38, at 147 n.1 (citing empirical 
study that “found the juries instructed not to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment plea were no more likely to convict the accused than were juries receiving no judicial 
commentary on the meaning and use of the privilege”); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and 
Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 72 (1990) (“[R]esearch by psychologists 
demonstrates that instructing jurors to disregard the silence will not accomplish the task.”); id. at 
89 (“An admonition will not reduce the likelihood that jurors will draw adverse inferences from 
the defendant’s silence, but will tend to aggravate its prejudicial impact.”). Some defense counsel 
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Again the difference is statistically significant.101 Further, the weight of the 
silence penalty appears to be roughly equivalent to the “prior offender” 
penalty. Combining the two prior conviction conditions (Scenarios 3 and 4) 
results in a 78% conviction percentage. This is almost identical to the 
conviction percentage for Scenario 2 where the defendant did not testify and 
was not impeached with any past crime—76%. These findings support a 
hypothesis that both remaining silent at trial and the admission of a 
defendant’s prior convictions substantially decrease the prospects for 
acquittal. And the operative “silence” and “prior offender” penalties appear 
to harm defendants to a similar degree.  
IV. DATA FROM REAL TRIALS 
Mock juror studies only tell us so much. No matter how clear the patterns 
that emerge in juror simulations, doubts will persist as to whether these 
simulations accurately reflect juror decision making in actual trials. A clear 
picture of how real jurors react to defendant testimony requires data from 
real trials. 
The dataset with the highest potential to unlock the mysteries of 
defendant testimony comes from the National Center for State Courts 
(“NCSC”).102 In 2000 and 2001, the NCSC surveyed attorneys, judges and 
jurors participating in felony cases at four sites: Los Angeles, Phoenix, the 
District of Columbia, and the Bronx.103 The surveys solicited a broad range of 
 
actually view the instruction as harmful “because it calls attention to the defendant’s silence.” 
Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that “counsel admitted that 
attorneys often decide not to request such an instruction because it calls attention to the 
defendant’s silence” in rejecting claim of ineffective assistance based on failure to request 
instruction); Michaelwicz v. State, 186 S.W.3d 601, 624 n.12 (Tex. App. 2006) (noting that 
“[d]efense counsel frequently complain when the no adverse inferences instruction is given in 
the jury charge” and citing cases). Given the evidence that the instruction is ineffective and the 
danger of providing it in this scenario (where it would reveal the purpose of the simulation to 
participants, who would wonder why the scenario noted the defendant’s failure to testify if they 
were not to consider it), I did not include one.  
 101. Significant at p <0.05 with two-tailed hypothesis. See supra note 98 for methodology and 
a disclaimer regarding the import, in this context, of a finding of statistical significance. 
 102. The other major study of real trials in this context is “The American Jury” study by 
Kalven and Zeisel. The study conflates defendant testimony and prior record into one variable 
making it unhelpful for current purposes. KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 159 n.17, 179 
tbl.56. Nevertheless, as this choice indicates, Kalven and Zeisel come very close to assuming the 
equivalence that this Article hypothesizes. Id. (explaining that they grouped those with a revealed 
record with those who declined to take the stand because the jury penalizes defendants for “either 
the record of which the jury learns or the suspicion of a record because of the refusal to take the 
stand”). They also report cases where judges specifically note the jury’s learning of the 
defendant’s record through the evidence as a reason for conviction, and the authors add that 
their study “lends support to the legal tradition which so closely guards the disclosure of a prior 
record in a criminal case.” Id. at 389–90. 
 103. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A 
PROBLEM? 29 (2002).  
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case-specific information as part of an inquiry into the frequency and causes 
of hung juries. The information included whether the defendant testified, 
admission of prior convictions, and case outcomes.104 The surveys also asked 
jurors and judges to assess the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.105 
Analyzing data from real cases raises a number of challenges. The 
challenges range from specific quibbles with the NCSC data set to big picture 
questions about the daunting variability of criminal trials. With respect to 
specific quibbles, the NCSC data on “criminal record” is not ideal. It captures 
“criminal record” broadly but imprecisely, lumping together all convictions 
and arrests. The survey asked: “During the trial, did the jury become aware of 
the defendant’s criminal history (if any)?”106 Respondents answered: “Yes,” 
“No” and “Not applicable (no known arrests/convictions).”107 Important 
information that is not captured by this question is whether an arrest led to 
conviction and whether the conviction was for a petty offense (e.g., 
misdemeanor) that typically cannot be used as impeachment.108 More subtle 
ambiguity comes from data coding choices. If a jury acquitted a defendant of 
murder, but convicted of the lesser (but perhaps uncontested) offense of 
unlicensed gun possession, is that a conviction or an acquittal?109 What about 
hung juries? To minimize empirical objections and unintended variation, and 
facilitate comparison to other articles that analyze the NCSC data, this Article 
draws primarily on the published analysis of the NCSC data by Eisenberg and 
Hans. These prominent legal empiricists have already extracted the most 
pertinent data regarding defendant testimony from the NCSC data set for 
their article on the impact of prior convictions.110 
Finally, no study of real cases can capture all the variables that influenced 
a jury verdict. Instead, the hope is that randomly pooled variation in a 
 
 104. Id. at 1–3 (describing purpose of study). To review the questionnaires, see generally 
PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF HUNG JURIES IN 
BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, 
AND WASHINGTON, DC, 2000–2001: CODEBOOK AND DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT (2003). 
 105. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 103, at 73–74, 85. 
 106. Id. at 67. 
 107. Id.; see also Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1365 (acknowledging that “we lack 
information about the nature of defendants’ prior crimes”); id. at 1389 (“[W]e had information 
only about the presence of a defendant’s criminal record, not its type.”).  
 108. See FED. R. EVID. 609; cf. Blume, supra note 21, at 490 n.50 (critiquing the same finding 
on the ground that the data used in the Eisenberg and Hans study “did not permit a 
determination of whether the prior conviction could have been used for impeachment 
purposes”). In addition, the study’s authors reported that over 25% of the responses did not 
answer the question at all. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL.,  supra note 104. 
 109. Givelber and Farrell count all convictions as wins for the prosecution. DANIEL GIVELBER 
& AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT? 176 n.41 (2012). Neither Laudan 
and Allen, nor Eisenberg and Hans appear to state how they coded mixed results, suggesting that 
they similarly viewed a conviction for any offense as a “conviction” even if the ultimate result 
reflected some corresponding acquittals. 
 110. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7. 
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sufficient number of cases will permit the detection of broad patterns that 
reflect underlying realities. Definitive conclusions from the NCSC data alone 
will be impossible. Like the perceptions of judges and attorneys who work in 
the criminal justice system, and the mock juror simulations discussed above, 
the NCSC data simply offer another place to look in an effort to understand 
how jurors react to defendant testimony. 
With the above caveats, the NCSC data support many of the propositions 
already discussed. Only about half of defendants testified.111 Defendants with 
prior records were less likely to testify.112 And those who did testify were more 
likely to have their criminal records presented to the jury.113 Defendants who 
were members of racial minority groups testified less frequently, but this 
finding was only “marginally statistically significant” and can be attributed to 
“different rates of prior criminal records”; the few female defendants testified 
more frequently than male defendants.114 Interestingly, the reported 
evidentiary strength of the cases did not differ significantly between those 
cases where the defendants did and did not testify.115  
A. THE NCSC “PARADOX” 
The NCSC data present what other commentators have described as a 
“seeming paradox” and “puzzling” result.116 The paradox begins with the not-
so-surprising finding that juries convicted at a much higher rate if the 
defendant had a criminal record (76%) than if the defendant had no record 
(56%).117 The perplexing aspect of the data is that juries convicted 
defendants with prior crimes at approximately the same rate whether their 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1371 & tbl.1. 
 113. Id. at 1378 (“A defendant’s testifying is the only factor substantially and significantly 
contributing to whether the jury learned of the defendant’s prior criminal record.”) The NCSC 
data does not suggest as strong a relation between defendant testimony and impeachment as 
pertinent legal doctrine might suggest, perhaps due to the catch-all nature of the criminal history 
question. See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 104, at 7; Eisenberg & Hans, supra 
note 7, at 1365 (acknowledging that “we lack information about the nature of defendants’ prior 
crimes”); id. at 1389 (“[W]e had information only about the presence of a defendant’s criminal 
record, not its type.”); cf. Blume, supra note 21, at 490 n.50 (critiquing same finding on the 
ground that the data used in the Eisenberg and Hans study “did not permit a determination of 
whether the prior conviction could have been used for impeachment purposes”). 
 114. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1372. 
 115. Id. (“[T]here are no significant differences in the strength of evidence between cases of 
defendants who did or did not testify.”); id. at 1378 (reporting regression model results 
attempting to determine “whether a defendant testifying is associated with the strength of the 
evidence as reported by juries” and “whether the strength of the evidence, as reported by judges, 
is associated with whether a defendant testified” and finding “no significant association in either 
relation”). 
 116. Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 493, 499. 
 117. Id. at 504 tbl.2. 
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convictions were revealed to the jury or not.118 Thus, the NCSC data’s surprise for 
researchers was: “It is whether or not the defendant has a criminal record—
not whether the jury learns about it—that has the greatest influence on the 
acquittal/conviction decision.”119 
While others have flagged this curious finding,120 no one has produced a 
compelling explanation for it. Larry Laudan and Ronald Allen, who make this 
finding the centerpiece of a provocative article, grapple with the question 
most directly.121 They conclude that the NCSC data show that the purportedly 
devastating impact of the admission of prior crimes evidence is a myth that 
has bedazzled attorneys, policymakers, and scholars for decades.122 
“Admitting evidence of prior crimes,” they argue, “apparently leads to few 
additional convictions.”123 They surmise that jurors “are generally able to infer 
who has priors” regardless of whether the prior crimes are made known to 
them in the evidence.124  
For ease of reference, I will call Laudan and Allen’s hypothesis the “jury 
sophistication” hypothesis. In light of their hypothesis, Laudan and Allen 
disparage efforts through evidence rules and litigation strategy to keep prior 
convictions out of evidence as “self-defeating,” and label academic criticism 
of the admission of prior crimes “unnecessary hyperbole.”125 If Laudan and 
Allen’s interpretation is correct, volumes of scholarly articles and judicial 
opinions, along with a number of evidence rules—what Laudan and Allen 
label “the criminal justice system’s fetish about excluding prior crimes”126—
 
 118. Id. at 498. 
 119. Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1167, 1190 (2005); see also Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1380 (noting that with respect 
to defendants with prior records, “conviction rates did not noticeably differ between defendants 
who testified and those who did not”). 
 120. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1380; Givelber, supra note 119 at 1190.  
 121. Laudan & Allen, supra note 21. 
 122. See id. at 496 (“One way or another, all of these hypotheses undergirding the 
conventional wisdom about prior crimes evidence are empirically testable. More than that, they 
have already been tested and most stand refuted or, at least, rendered highly implausible.”). 
 123. Id. at 498. 
 124. Id. at 508–09, 519 (“[J]urors will generally know when the defendant has no prior 
record and can usually infer when he is a serial felon.”); id. at 521 (“[J]urors generally figure out 
which defendants have prior convictions . . . .”); id. at 522 (“[J]urors can readily infer that a 
defendant is a serial felon even when no priors are admitted . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 515 (“Refusing to admit prior crimes evidence for fear that jurors will over-
interpret its significance or derive some propensity inferences from it is, in the current system, 
self-defeating.”); id. at 498 (“[A] jury’s learning of prior crimes directly through the evidence is 
not the inflammatory, unfairly prejudicial, conviction-ensuring information it is often depicted 
as being. . . . [R]ailing against the admissibility of prior crimes on the grounds that they unfairly 
disadvantage defendants with criminal records is unnecessary hyperbole.”); id. at 499 (“[N]ot 
much depends on the admissions of the priors.”). 
 126. Id. at 507.  
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must be rewritten; and attorneys have for decades been pointlessly fighting 
over, and tailoring trial strategies to, the admission of prior convictions.127 
As explained below, Laudan and Allen’s ground shaking juror-
sophistication hypothesis is not the best explanation for the NCSC data. Their 
theory is initially undermined by the experimental data analyzed in Part II.128 
This experimental evidence reveals that when mock jurors are told that the 
defendant has a prior record, they convict more readily. This finding is 
difficult to reconcile with Laudan and Allen’s claim that real jurors are 
indifferent to being told about prior crimes evidence. As discussed earlier, 
Laudan and Allen’s response to this challenge—that the mock juror evidence 
is “all over the map”—is incorrect.129 Further, Laudan and Allen’s hypothesis 
contradicts the near-universal views of practitioners, judges, academics and 
policymakers that informing jurors of prior convictions powerfully impacts 
defendants’ prospects.130 Everyone else may be wrong, of course, but the 
existence of such a robust countervailing consensus raises a red flag. 
There are a number of other possible explanations for why defendants 
with a criminal record fare worse at trial regardless of juror awareness of the 
prior record. This Article posits the “parallel penalty” hypothesis as the best 
explanation,131 but others come to mind as well. For example, a criminal 
record correlates with lower income.132 Lower income means defendants will 
be unlikely to afford a (perhaps superior) private attorney. But as paid 
attorneys appear in less than 18% of criminal cases,133 this “free-attorney 
hypothesis” can only be a partial explanation. Further, elite public defender 
offices in large cities like those studied in the NCSC survey (e.g., the District 
of Columbia’s Public Defender Service or the Bronx Defenders) may actually 
outperform retained counsel.134  
 
 127. Id. at 498 (“[T]he strenuous efforts of legal experts and defense attorneys to restrict the 
admissibility of prior crimes evidence seem misplaced.”). 
 128. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Givelber, supra note 119, at 1189 (recognizing “the universal perception” that the 
jury’s hearing of a criminal record negatively impacts the defendant’s prospects); Laudan  
& Allen, supra note 21, at 494 (recognizing consensus). 
 131. See infra Part IV.E. 
 132. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences 
Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-
records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (reporting on studies 
that reflect correlation between arrests record and lower income). 
 133. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) (reporting that, in 1996, 17.6% of defendants in state felony cases in 
the 75 largest counties retained a private attorney). 
 134. See Jeffrey Bellin, Attorney Competence in an Age of Plea Bargaining and Econometrics, 12 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 153, 153, 155 (2014) (discussing reputation of D.C. Public Defender Service 
and study that found Philadelphia public defenders outperformed court-appointed, private 
attorneys); Brooks Holland, Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 30 N.Y.U. 
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Another explanation could be the relationship between criminal history 
and an increased likelihood of pretrial detention.135 Defendants held pending 
trial generally fare worse than those released.136 But again, this “pretrial 
detention hypothesis” seems at best a partial explanation. As explained below, 
neither these explanations nor the one posited by Lauden and Allen 
convincingly account for the NCSC data. 
The “parallel penalty” hypothesis presented in this Article represents the 
best explanation for the “puzzling” NCSC data. Under this hypothesis, the 
equivalent conviction rates for defendants with criminal records do not result 
from jurors detecting hidden convictions, or variations in lawyer quality or 
pretrial release. Rather, unrevealed convictions inflict harm indirectly by 
causing defendants to remain silent at trial, leading to a “silence penalty.” If 
this alternative manifestation of a criminal record harms defendants roughly 
as much as the introduction of prior convictions, the NCSC data fall neatly 
into place.  
The “parallel penalty” hypothesis is not as jarring to the conventional 
wisdom as Laudan and Allen’s juror sophistication hypothesis, but it 
nonetheless demands a deeper appreciation of the importance of trial silence 
to American jurors. The balance of this Part analyzes specific slices of the 
NCSC data to determine whether the “parallel penalty” hypothesis or the 
alternatives better explain the data. (Each subsection below includes an 
introductory table to highlight the NCSC data slice to be discussed.) 
B. DEFENDANTS WITHOUT PRIORS: TESTIFYING V. NON-TESTIFYING  
Table 4 
 
Defendants w/o Priors Conviction Rate Number (n)137 
Testify 41% 49 
Did Not Testify 70% 30 
 
 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 637 (2006) (describing “Bronx Defenders [as] a well respected 
public defender office in Bronx County”). 
 135. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT 
PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990–2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 
6 (2007) (reporting that defendants with a prior arrest or prior conviction “had a lower 
probability of [pretrial] release”). 
 136. Id. at 7 tbl.5 (reporting that 69% of held defendants and 46% of released defendants 
were subsequently convicted of a felony offense). One explanation for this finding is that judges 
consider the strength of the evidence against a defendant in deciding whether to grant release. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (2012) (including “the weight of the evidence against the 
person” among factors the judge must consider in determining conditions of release). 
 137.  This table is derived from Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 516 tbl.6. Laudan and 
Allen do not provide the number of defendants from which they obtained these percentages. To 
obtain an approximation, I drew the number of defendants with these characteristics from 
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1. 
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We begin with the data for defendants without prior convictions. This 
comparison provides the most straightforward evidence that a silence penalty 
and not jury sophistication about hidden criminal records, or other factors 
that correlate with criminal records, explains the “seeming paradox.” Table 4 
shows that when defendants without prior convictions testified, they were 
convicted 41% of the time—a startlingly low percentage considering the high 
overall conviction rates.138 When defendants without prior convictions did not 
testify, their conviction percentage skyrocketed to 70%.139 
Thus, for defendants without prior convictions, testifying coincided with 
an almost doubling of the chances of acquittal. As this variation emerges 
among defendants without a criminal record, the “pretrial detention” and 
“free-attorney” hypotheses cannot explain it. Of course, case-specific facts 
undoubtedly play a key role and many variables are not captured in the NCSC 
study. Still, the data presented in Table 4 constitute circumstantial evidence 
that a “silence penalty” exists in the American trial system. Like the mock 
jurors discussed in Part III, jurors in real cases appear to be more willing to 
convict defendants who remain silent at trial. 
C. DEFENDANTS WITH PRIORS: TESTIFYING V. NON-TESTIFYING 
Table 5 
 
Defendants w/ Priors Conviction Rate Number (n)140 
Testify 77% 101 
Did Not Testify 72% 123 
 
The analysis for defendants with prior convictions is more complex but 
again supports the parallel penalty hypothesis. Just as the silence penalty hurts 
defendants without prior records who remain silent, it should harm 
defendants with prior convictions who decline to testify. But the silence 
penalty will not be as readily identified for these defendants. Testifying 
strongly correlates with the introduction of prior convictions.141 This means 
defendants with prior convictions can typically only avoid the silence penalty 
by (testifying and) suffering a prior offender penalty instead. Thus, the 
powerful benefit from testifying that appears in Table 4 should not reappear 
 
 138. See Laudan & Allen, supra note 22, at 516 tbl.6 (finding same). 
 139. See id. (finding same). This data comes from Laudan and Allen’s own analysis of the 
NCSC data sets. Id. at 516 n.71. Laudan and Allen do not provide information on the evidentiary 
strength of the cases within this subset, but we do know from Eisenberg and Hans’s analysis of 
the same data that there was no significant difference overall in the perceived evidentiary strength 
between cases in which the defendant testified or remained silent. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 
7, at 1371. 
 140. These numbers come from Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381 tbl.8. 
 141. See sources cited supra notes 36–37.  
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in Table 5. Any benefit prior offender defendants gain by avoiding the 
“silence penalty” will be offset by a “prior offender penalty.” 
Rather than reflecting the benefits of testifying, data broadly comparing 
prior offenders who testify to those who do not should reflect the relative 
powers of the silence and prior offender penalties. (Recall that evidentiary 
strength did not differ significantly between cases with testifying and non-
testifying defendants.)142 A possibility suggested by the juror simulation 
discussed in Part III is that the two penalties are roughly equivalent.143 If so, 
we would expect that the conviction percentages for defendants with priors 
will remain about the same whether they testify or remain silent. This fits the 
NCSC data. Table 4 reflects that defendants with priors who testified were 
convicted about 77% of the time.144 Defendants with priors who declined to 
testify were convicted about 72% of the time.145 
Concededly, the rough equivalence of the conviction rates between prior 
offenders who testify and those who remain silent also supports Laudan and 
Allen’s juror sophistication hypotheses. It could be, as they argue, that jurors 
are somehow correctly divining that these silent defendants have prior 
convictions and penalizing accordingly. Similarly, the results could also 
support the free-attorney and pretrial detention hypotheses. Under these 
hypotheses, no matter what tactic this subset of defendants choose, their 
disproportionate inability to hire private counsel and secure pretrial release 
dominates acquittal prospects. Note, however, that contrary to the empirical 
evidence presented so far, all of these competing hypothesis only fit the NCSC 
data if there is no silence penalty. Under these alternative theories, silence has 
no negative effect. Table 5 reflects that defendants with prior crimes who 
testified were convicted at least as often as those who remained silent. Thus, 
while each of the posited theories can claim some support from this slice of 
the NCSC data (Table 5), the parallel penalty hypothesis (i.e., a rough 
equivalence of the silence and prior offender penalties) provides a stronger 
explanation for the equivalent conviction rates. Juries are quick to convict 
defendants with prior records if they do not testify or if they testify and are 
impeached with their prior crimes, and the respective penalties in either 
scenario are roughly the same. 
The results hold if we look at a purer (if smaller) comparison of the prior 
offender and silence penalties by comparing defendants with a prior record 
who do not testify—and whose convictions are not disclosed—with defendants who 
do testify and whose convictions are disclosed. Juries convicted defendants who 
 
 142. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1, 1381 tbl.8. 
 143. See supra Part III.B. 
 144. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381 tbl.8 (76.6% and 77.8% conviction rates for 
two subsets of defendants with prior convictions who testified). 
 145. Id. (reporting 71.4% and 72.7% conviction rates for two subsets of defendants with 
prior convictions who did not testify). 
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successfully hid their prior record by remaining silent in 71.4% of cases.146 
Juries convicted defendants who testified and had their record disclosed in 
77.8% of cases.147 Interestingly, the NCSC data here closely tracks the trial 
simulation described in Part III, where mock jurors convicted non-testifying 
defendants 76% of the time and convicted impeached defendants 78% of the 
time.148 
D. NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANTS: PRIORS V. NO PRIORS 
Table 6 
 
Defendants Who Did Not Testify Conviction Rate Number (n)149 
Prior Record 72% 123 
No Prior Record 70% 30 
 
A silence penalty should harm defendants equally regardless of whether 
they have a criminal record. If, however, jurors are adept at detecting 
undisclosed criminal records, as Laudan and Allen propose, silent defendants 
with criminal records will fare worse than those without. Similarly, if income 
effects of a prior record or likelihood of pretrial release drive the data, we 
should see a broad criminal-record-related variance between silent 
defendants. Instead, the NCSC data summarized in Table 6 strongly supports 
the parallel-penalty hypothesis. 
Table 6 shows that the conviction rate for defendants with a prior record 
who declined to testify (72%)150 is almost identical to the conviction rate for 
defendants without a prior record who declined to testify (70%).151 This is 
what we would expect if a silence penalty influences the outcome. As the jury 
generally remains ignorant of any prior convictions when the defendant 
declines to testify, both sets of non-testifying defendants should suffer the 
same single penalty (the silence penalty). The jury never hears of the non-
testifying prior offenders’ criminal records and so the conviction rates of the 
two groups of non-testifying defendants should be roughly equal. The NCSC 
data (Table 6) fits, revealing an almost identical likelihood of conviction. To 
jurors, these non-testifying defendants are broadly indistinguishable, and they 
suffer similar outcomes. If jurors were somehow detecting prior convictions, 
as Laudan and Allen claim, we would expect a different result. Similarly, if 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Supra Part III.B. 
 149. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381 tbl.8; supra Table 4. 
 150. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381 tbl.8 (reporting 71.4% and 72.7% conviction 
rates for two subsets of defendants with prior convictions who did not testify). 
 151. Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 516 tbl.6. 
A1_BELLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2018  11:43 PM 
424 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:395 
defendants with prior records were suffering worse outcomes across the board 
due to subpar attorneys or pretrial detention, the data should look different. 
E. A TOUCH OF DISCORDANT DATA 
The parallel penalty hypothesis appears to fit the NCSC data better than 
the alternatives, but it is not a perfect fit. Assuming the silence penalty is held 
constant, the parallel penalty theory predicts that the “prior offender penalty” 
would only appear when the jury is aware of the defendant’s prior record. Yet 
in one slice of NCSC data, jury awareness of a prior record does not have the 
anticipated effect on trial outcomes. Among testifying defendants with prior 
convictions, the conviction rate was only slightly lower (76.6% vs. 77.8%) 
when their convictions remained unknown to the jury.152 All things being 
equal, the parallel penalty hypothesis predicts that the conviction rate for 
prior-offender defendants who testify and are not impeached would be 
relatively lower since those defendants should not suffer the “prior offender 
penalty.” This is the one cell of the NCSC data that the parallel penalty 
hypothesis struggles to explain.153 As we are dealing with real cases, the most 
likely explanation is that case-specific factors in this relatively modest sample 
of unusual cases (where defendants testify despite a criminal record, but are 
nevertheless not impeached with that record in cross-examination) skew the 
expected percentages. 
Indeed, this curious finding drew the attention of Eisenberg and Hans, 
who scoured the NCSC data for evidence of the impact of the disclosure of 
prior convictions.154 They determined that the relatively similar conviction 
rates in this data slice obscured important variance in evidence strength. With 
evidentiary strength factored in, the prior offender penalty resurfaces as 
predicted: “[J]ury knowledge of prior criminal history is significantly 
associated with conviction in weak [prosecution] cases and not significantly 
associated with conviction in strong cases.”155 
Eisenberg and Hans’s further exploration of this data helps the case for 
the parallel penalty theory and also highlights an important point. The silence 
and prior offender penalties push juries toward convictions, but they are by 
 
 152. Id. at 506 tbl.5; Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381 tbl.8. 
 153. Laudan and Allen also claim support from the indistinguishable conviction rates 
between non-testifying defendants with prior convictions whose convictions were disclosed 
(72.7%) and those whose convictions were not disclosed (71.4%). Laudan & Allen, supra note 
21, at 512. But this result should be dismissed as an artifact of a small sample size. Because “juries 
rarely learn of criminal records unless defendants testify,” the first percentage comes from an 
idiosyncratic subset of only 11 cases Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1379, 1381 tbl.8. As 
Laudan and Allen acknowledge, “[a] strong word of caution is in order . . . . [when] we focus on 
issues that segment th[e] sample down to smaller and smaller subsets.” Laudan & Allen, supra 
note 21, at 505 n.45. 
 154. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1381–83. 
 155. Id. at 1383. 
A1_BELLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2018  11:43 PM 
2018] THE SILENCE PENALTY 425 
no means dispositive. Facts matter most.156 The smaller the number of cases, 
the higher the risk that unmeasured distinctions across case categories will 
overwhelm any prior offender or silence penalty. 
In sum, while one narrow slice of the NCSC data does not support the 
parallel penalty hypothesis, the variance can be explained. Deeper statistical 
analysis of this slice by Eisenberg and Hans hints at variation in case 
characteristics that skew the observed percentages. Consequently, the parallel 
penalty hypothesis remains an attractive explanation of the NCSC data 
overall. 
The parallel penalty theory fits the NCSC data fairly well—no small feat 
given the daunting variability of criminal trials. The parallel penalty 
hypothesis is also consistent with the extant experimental evidence 
summarized in Parts II and III, and refines (rather than defies) the decades-
old collective wisdom of judges, practitioners, academics and American 
evidence rules.157 Although there is undoubtedly more to this complex story, 
the parallel penalty hypothesis fits the empirical data better than the 
alternatives and provides a promising theoretical framework for how 
American jurors react to defendant testimony and its absence. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
The previous Parts set out the theoretical and empirical case for the 
parallel penalty hypothesis. This Part discusses the implications of these 
findings. It begins with tactical implications primarily of interest to 
practitioners and judges, and then moves to broader implications of chief 
concern to policymakers and legal scholars. 
 
 156. Cf. id. at 1380 (“Studies of jury behavior indicate that the strength of the evidence 
dominates decision making.”). 
 157. Laudan and Allen also cite a study of 201 Indianapolis jury trials to support their 
conclusions, but that study offers more support for the parallel penalty hypothesis. Laudan  
& Allen, supra note 21, at 507 (citing Myers, supra note 11, at 792). Consistent with the NCSC 
data, Myers found that a record of prior convictions increased the likelihood of conviction. Myers, 
supra note 11, at 793 tbl.2. Laudan and Allen emphasize that this supports their juror 
sophistication hypothesis because “in most cases jurors never learned about the priors directly 
through the evidence.” Laudan & Allen, supra note 21, at 507. Myers does not report that the 
prior convictions were rarely admitted, and Laudan and Allen don’t include a citation for their 
assertion; perhaps they, like Shaffer, are misreading Myers’s study to suggest that 82% of 
defendants did not testify (and then assuming that therefore “most” jurors never learned of the 
convictions). See infra notes 168–76 and accompanying text. Even if Laudan and Allen’s 
assumption is accurate, however, Myers’s findings support the parallel penalty hypothesis as well: 
Defendants with prior convictions are convicted more frequently because they are either 
impeached or do not testify. This appears to be how Myers interprets her own data, summarizing 
her findings as follows: “Jurors were more likely to convict if the defendant had numerous prior 
convictions . . . , and thus may have been potentially discreditable as a witness.” Myers, supra note 
11, at 792–93; see also id. at 795 (“[Jury] rulings tended to be adverse where the defendant was 
discredited or discreditable.”). 
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A. DEFENDANTS SHOULD TESTIFY MORE OFTEN 
The empirical data presented in Parts II, III, and IV support two aspects 
of the conventional wisdom regarding trial tactics. The data reinforce the 
widely-held view that juries rely on impermissible propensity reasoning to 
convict when informed that the defendant has previously broken the law (the 
“prior offender penalty”). The data also suggest that juries punish defendants 
for remaining silent at trial with a “silence penalty.” Finally, and most 
strikingly, the data suggest something not captured in the conventional 
wisdom—that the silence penalty is roughly as damaging as the prior offender 
penalty.  
The surprising power of the silence penalty should give pause to the 
many defendants without a prior record who demand a trial but then decline 
to take the witness stand (nearly 40% of trial defendants in the NCSC data).158 
By testifying, these defendants could avoid both the silence penalty and the 
prior offender penalty. Declining to testify, by contrast, puts them in the same 
position as a defendant with prior convictions. This is a major blow to acquittal 
prospects and one that (tactically speaking) should be avoided if at all 
possible. 
Of course, case and defendant-specific factors can overwhelm general 
trends. Defense counsel may believe that juries will react so negatively to their 
client’s appearance on the witness stand that any silence penalty pales in 
comparison. Noted defense advocate and law professor Barbara Babcock 
recognizes all the familiar reasons a defendant without prior convictions 
might not take the stand, including “that he has no defense . . . . or maybe he 
is unattractive, even scary, or slow and obtuse so that he could hurt, rather 
than help himself as a witness.”159 But drawing on her experience as a public 
defender, Babcock emphasizes that “few defendants who fail to testify win 
their cases” and notes the critical role for defense lawyers in this equation.160 
“[Defendants] who are well-defended rehearse their testimony; the better 
defended they are the more they rehearse.”161 Babcock further urges counsel 
to place their client’s testimony in context when necessary. For example, 
counsel can argue to the jury that the defendant never “deviate[d] from her 
basic testimony in this case: she is not guilty” despite the “unequal contest” 
between “my client, with her sixth grade education, who has never before 
spoken to an audience in public” and the “government prosecutor with her 
 
 158. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1. 
 159. Babcock, supra note 89, at 14–15; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty to Defend, 114 
YALE L.J. 1489, 1514 (2005); cf. Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment Prohibition of 
Adverse Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 269–80 (2010) 
(exploring reasons defendants may not testify).  
 160. Babcock, supra note 89, at 12, 14–15; cf. 3 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR 
THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 390 (3d ed. 1974) (“[T]he defendant probably ought to testify 
unless there are reasons of substance why he should not.”). 
 161. Babcock, supra note 89, at 15. 
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decades of learning, and years of experience.”162 “[T]his argument alone, can 
make it worth the defendant’s taking the stand, even if his testimony is weak 
in substance and halting in style.”163 The empirical data marshalled above 
support Babcock’s contention. Absent “strong affirmative” case or defendant-
specific reasons to avoid the witness stand, defendants without prior 
convictions should testify to avoid a powerful silence penalty.164  
Defendants with prior convictions should similarly consider the power of 
the silence penalty before reflexively embracing the widely-accepted tactic of 
refusing to testify to hide one’s criminal record. Failing to testify may reduce 
the impact of a prior conviction, but it only does so by exposing the defendant 
to a damaging silence penalty. In cases where the defendant’s testimony 
would add salient facts to the jury’s deliberations or where the prior 
conviction is not likely to generate negative propensity reasoning (e.g., a 
different type of crime than the charged crime), testifying may well be the 
best tactic. Even when impeachment results, the data suggest that, at worst, 
defendants end up in about the same position they would have occupied if 
they declined to testify.165 Rather than reflexively silencing defendants, 
counsel should begin with a presumption that their clients will benefit if they 
take the witness stand. 
Ethical constraints also operate. A lawyer cannot sponsor witness 
testimony that she knows to be untrue.166 That said, “[t]he conventional 
defense view also holds that a lawyer ‘knows’ only if the client has told him so 
categorically.”167 
Again we must pause to consider a discordant sentiment by an expert 
commentator. As already noted, experiments by one of the leading 
researchers on defendant testimony, psychologist David Shaffer, highlight the 
damage done to defendants when they do not testify. Shaffer is, nevertheless, 
“hesitant to advise against” remaining silent at trial because of the results of a 
study by sociologist Martha Myers.168 Shaffer’s reluctance is worth exploring 
because, as discussed below, it appears to be based on a misreading of Myers’s 
data.  
Shaffer claims that Myers’s research on Indianapolis trials in the mid-
1970s determined that “82 percent of the defendants in her sample did not 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Cf. AMSTERDAM, supra note 160. 
 165. There are other adverse consequences to testifying, such as sentencing enhancements 
in certain jurisdictions, if the judge finds that the defendant lied on the stand. See Jeffrey Bellin, 
Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 868–80 (2008) (exploring disadvantages of testifying). 
 166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 & cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 167. Babcock, supra note 159, at 1513; cf. Silver, supra note 9, at 423–24 (advocating 
elimination of ethical limits on presentation of client’s testimony). 
 168. Shaffer, supra note 38, at 144 (relying on Myers’s study as basis for the hesitancy despite 
his own findings). 
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testify,” and that she “found that defendants who testified were more likely to 
be convicted than those who did not.”169 As this stunning 82% number 
suggests, Shaffer misreads Myers’s study. (Recall the comparable figure for 
non-testifying defendants from the NCSC study was 50%; and the percentage 
from the famous but dated 1950s Kalven and Zeisel study is 18%).170 The 
variable in Myers’s study that Shaffer is interpreting as defendant testimony is 
labeled, “X3 Testimony of Defendant and/or Accomplices.”171 Right away a 
problem is apparent: A variable intended to measure whether the defendant 
presented exculpatory testimony should not also include testimony from 
“[a]ccomplices.” Myers did find that the X3 variable and two other measures 
correlate strongly with convictions: “[J]uries were more likely to convict if: the 
defendant or accomplice made a statement about his involvement in the 
crime or lack thereof (X3); a weapon was recovered (X6); and a large number 
of witnesses was specified in the indictment or information (X7).”172 But as 
this excerpt indicates, the X3 variable primarily captures not defendant 
testimony, but prosecution evidence, such as admissible pretrial statements of 
the defendant and accomplices to police.173 Myers describes the variable as a 
defendant (or accomplice) making a “statement,” codes it as “[n]one” or 
“[o]ne or more statements,” and includes it among other pro-prosecution 
evidentiary variables such as recovery of a weapon.174 Further, Myers fails to 
editorialize on the finding at any point.175 One would expect Myers to 
highlight and discuss an earth-shattering finding that defendant testimony 
typically backfires, strongly increasing the likelihood of conviction. It is not 
surprising, however, that Myers did not discuss the finding if she understood 
it to be mundane—that pretrial statements to police “about [the defendant’s] 
involvement in the crime” increase the likelihood of conviction.176 In sum, the 
 
 169. Id. at 127, 144. Eisenberg and Hans also appear to read the study this way, explaining 
that Myers found that “in just 36 [of 201] jury trials, the defendant (or accomplices) provided 
statements or testimony about involvement or lack of involvement in the crime.” Eisenberg  
& Hans, supra note 7, at 1364. 
 170. Kalven and Zeisel reported the opposite—that 82% of defendants testified—in their 
study of trials in 1954–1955. KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 144. This dated study is 
actually closer to the date of Myers’s 1974–1976 study than Myers is to the NCSC (2000–2001) 
study, making Shaffer’s interpretation of Myers finding even more unlikely. 
 171. Myers, supra note 11, at 786 tbl.1; Shaffer, supra note 38, at 127.  
 172. Myers, supra note 11, at 792. 
 173. This explains why Myers grouped accomplice and defendant statements together. 
Pretrial statements by defendants and accomplices recorded by police will generally be 
incriminatory. (Myers gathered data from the prosecutor’s “file folder” and “police arrest 
records.”). Id. at 785. By contrast, grouping trial testimony of accomplices and defendants makes 
little sense, as trial testimony by defendants will always be exculpatory whereas testimony by 
accomplices is often incriminating. 
 174. Id. at 786 tbl.1 (emphasis added).  
 175. Id. at 787. 
 176. I contacted Myers on this point and she agreed with my interpretation of her findings. 
E-mail from Martha Myers, Emeritus Professor, Univ. of Ga., to Jeffrey Bellin, Cabell Research 
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finding Shaffer interprets as showing that defendants who testify are convicted 
more often says something very different. Shaffer and others who shy away 
from recommending that defendants testify based on Myers’s results are 
misreading her study. 
B. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE GOVERNING DEFENDANT 
TESTIMONY 
The impacts of the silence and prior offender penalties described in the 
preceding sections reach far beyond trial tactics. As discussed in the next 
subparts, the empirical data summarized in Parts II through IV constitute a 
powerful indictment of the current legal framework. 
One powerful implication of the existence of substantial silence and 
prior offender penalties is that legal doctrine designed to eliminate these 
penalties is ineffective. Two critical legal rules are in play: (1) jurors may not 
draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s refusal to testify;177 (2) when 
defendants do testify and are impeached with prior convictions, juries cannot 
consider the evidence as showing a criminal propensity.178 The empirical data 
analyzed above indicate that the legal system fails to effectively enforce both 
rules. Jurors are drawing adverse inferences from the defendant’s failure to 
testify—the “silence penalty.” And jurors improperly consider prior 
convictions offered solely as credibility impeachment as evidence of criminal 
propensities—the “prior offender penalty.” The penalties turn up consistently 
in experimental studies with mock jurors (see Parts II and III). They also 
appear to be powerful enough that they can be observed across a broad run 
of cases in data from real trials (see Part IV). To the extent the criminal justice 
system cares about enforcing its own rules, the data presented in this Article 
generate cause for concern. In this critical context, it appears that Justice 
Robert Jackson’s cynical critique rings true: “The naive assumption that 
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”179 
C. DISTORTIONS OF JURY FACTFINDING  
The data marshalled above also suggest that jurors indulge rough and 
often incorrect proxies for guilt that may interfere with their search for truth. 
 
Professor of Law, William & Mary Law Sch. (July 16, 2015, 5:50 PM) (on file with author). 
Professor Myers graciously allowed me to relate her agreement with my interpretation of her 
study. Id. 
 177. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment requires that 
a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by a 
defendant to do so.”); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (stating that the Fifth 
Amendment precludes “either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or 
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”). 
 178. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997). 
 179. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
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The damage begins with the startling number of defendants who demand trial 
but decline to testify, depriving factfinders of a witness “who above all others 
may be in a position to meet the prosecution’s case.”180 When defendants do 
not testify, juries not only lose a testimonial resource, they are also tempted 
to draw an inference of guilt from that silence. Although prohibited by law, 
the inference may be warranted in certain circumstances—and thus not 
detrimental to the search for truth.181 But in many cases defendants decline 
to testify to avoid prior conviction impeachment. In that frequent scenario, 
jurors misread the silence signal; the defendant’s silence indeed suggests 
guilt, but it is guilt of a prior offense, not the offense for which he is on trial. 
Finally, when defendants do testify and are impeached with prior convictions, 
juries appear to slip into a form of propensity reasoning that causes them to 
overlook evidentiary weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.182 
The dangers described above come into sharp relief in studies of 
convicted defendants who were later exonerated by DNA evidence. A 
comprehensive survey by John Blume found that 39% of later-exonerated 
defendants did not testify in their own trials; another study puts the number 
at 47%.183 These numbers are moderately lower than the generic 50% non-
testifying rate in the NCSC study,184 suggesting that factual guilt is a factor, 
but not a powerful determinant of a defendant’s decision to testify. The factor 
that does seem determinative is a prior record. Blume reports that 91% of the 
later-exonerated defendants who did not testify “had prior convictions that 
potentially could have been used for impeachment purposes.”185 The fear of 
impeachment is well founded. Blume reports that “[i]n every single case in 
which a defendant with a prior record testified, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to impeach the defendant with his or her prior convictions.”186  
The stories of the exonerated defendants in Blume’s study parallel the 
themes presented in this Article. Legal rules inflate the number of silent 
defendants, and then distort jury factfinding by ensuring that no matter what 
course impeachable defendants take (testify or remain silent), juries receive 
 
 180. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961); Silver, supra note 9, at 357 (arguing 
that when defendants are silenced, “the factfinder is deprived . . . of the opportunity to learn 
directly about the defendant’s credibility and her version of the facts” and even in the case of 
lying defendants, is “deprived of the truthful information that typically accompanies falsehoods”). 
 181. See sources cited in supra notes 9, 176. 
 182. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1387 (noting that evidentiary strength ratings for 
convictions were lower for cases in which the defendant’s record was revealed); supra Part IV.E.  
 183. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 160 (2011) (reporting that 53% of “exonerees took the stand at trial to claim their 
innocence”); Blume, supra note 21, at 489. 
 184. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 185. Blume, supra note 21, at 490; see also GARRETT, supra note 183, at 162 (“Most of those 
who did not testify likely chose not to because they had prior convictions that could be used to 
discredit them.”). 
 186. Blume, supra note 21, at 490. 
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a strong, if legally proscribed, pro-conviction signal. It is no surprise then that 
Blume reaches a conclusion that sadly resonates with the findings described 
above: “[T]he current rules of evidence contribute to wrongful convictions.”187 
D. INCENTIVIZING GUILTY PLEAS AND EXACERBATING DISCRIMINATORY 
IMPACTS 
Two of the most troubling aspects of the modern criminal justice system 
are the sky-high prevalence of guilty pleas188 and the disproportionate impact 
of criminal punishment upon racial minorities.189 The historical data is 
unfortunately too sporadic to support definitive conclusions, but it hints that 
the parallel penalty dynamic plays a provocative and largely hidden role in 
each of these phenomena. 
The historical link between the parallel penalties and guilty pleas is most 
provocative. The parallel penalties highlighted in this Article first became 
possible in the late 1800s as states enacted laws permitting defendant 
testimony. Legal historian George Fisher posits an early connection between 
defendant testimony rights and guilty pleas, noting that the “dramatic 
conversion to a plea bargaining regime” in Middlesex County, Massachusetts 
“started about a decade after defendants first began to take the witness 
stand.”190 Data from other state jurisdictions similarly support a trend of 
increased plea bargaining starting “in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century”—the same time defendant testimony laws emerged.191  
But the parallel penalty dilemma may not have surfaced acutely with the 
onset of defendant testimony laws if the defendants standing trial were less 
likely to have a criminal record. In a time when jury trials more commonly 
concerned offenders with no official record, it would make sense—as Judge 
Ames predicted—for defendants to routinely take the witness stand. A 
defendant with a clean record can deftly sidestep the parallel penalty dilemma 
by testifying. 
As the population of potential offenders with criminal records increases, 
the dynamic changes. When more and more defendants have a criminal 
record, fewer can avoid the parallel penalty dilemma by testifying. Foregoing 
trial altogether through a guilty plea becomes the most rational tactic. 
Again, the historical evidence is by no means conclusive, but the 
apparently increasing prevalence of defendants with prior records, and 
 
 187. Id. at 479; see also Friedman, supra note 4 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 188. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 189. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
 190. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 109; see also Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL L. 
REV. 97, 107 (1928) (presenting historical data on plea bargaining). 
 191. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. 
J. 338, 350 (1982). 
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decreasing prevalence of defendant testimony suggests the promise of future 
inquiries. The analysis begins with a comparison of the NCSC data to the 
other broad survey of American jury decision making, Kalven and Zeisel’s 
fabled empirical examination of American trials. In 1954–1955, Kalven and 
Zeisel surveyed criminal trials in a variety of jurisdictions and found that 47% 
of trial defendants had a criminal record and 82% testified.192 By 2000–2001, 
the NCSC study reports that 76% of defendants had a criminal record and 
only 50% of defendants testified.193 The samples do not match up precisely, 
of course, but the data hint that the pool of defendants who can (and do) 
avoid the parallel penalty dynamic by testifying is shrinking. The Bureau of 
Justice Statistics similarly reports that the percentage of arrestees with a 
criminal record is increasing over time.194 This makes intuitive sense in light 
of the ballooning population of former felons. The pool of potential 
defendants with a criminal record is deeper than it has been at any other point 
in history. In 1974, for example, 1.8 million American adults had previously 
served time in state or federal prison.195 By 2001, that number was 5.6 million.196 
The parallel penalty-based pressure to plead guilty becomes particularly 
acute as more and more defendants face trial burdened with a prior record. 
These defendants can no longer cleanly avoid the silence penalty by testifying. 
And indeed guilty plea rates appear to have shot up once more in recent 
decades alongside the growing population of prior offenders. As a general 
matter, the proportion of guilty pleas increased in the past 35 years—the same 
time frame as the mass incarceration explosion.197 Causation is likely 
impossible to show as the variables are overlapping and interrelated. But the 
historical data we have fit an unsettling narrative. The parallel penalty 
dilemma makes trial unattractive for defendants with a criminal record, 
pushing these defendants to forego trial and plead guilty. And as defendants 
with criminal records increasingly become the norm rather than the 
 
 192. KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 144–45, 145 n.12. 
 193. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1. For an exploration of the similarities 
and differences between the two studies, including the narrow urban focus of the NCSC study 
versus the broader scope of Kalven and Zeisel, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement 
in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 171, 178–79 (2005). 
 194. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the percentage of felony arrestees “with a 
felony conviction record increased from 36% in 1990 to 43% in 2009.” REAVES, supra note 11, 
at 9. One would expect that the presence of a criminal record impacts the prosecutor’s calculus 
as to whether to pursue a case to trial. 
 195. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, 
at 1 (2003). 
 196. Id. 
 197. RAPHAEL & STOLL, supra note 1212, at 3–8 (discussing the increasing incarceration 
rate); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,  
566–67 nn.230–31 (2001) (surveying statistics suggesting similar trend in state courts); Ronald 
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 
90 (2005). 
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exception, the parallel penalty dilemma inevitably contributes to a steady 
increase in guilty pleas and a corresponding decrease in trials. 
There is another important piece to this story. The increasing prevalence 
of criminal records is not equally distributed among defendants.198 In the 
NCSC study, 71% of minority defendants had criminal records compared with 
55% of white defendants.199 This disparity is consistent with general 
population trends. While in 2010 the percentage of the non-African 
American adult population with a prior felony conviction reached a high of 
6%, that number was 25% for adult African Americans.200 This means that the 
pernicious effects of the parallel penalty dilemma disproportionately impact 
African-American defendants. The cycle is self-perpetuating. Every new 
conviction leads to a decreased likelihood of success in a subsequent trial and 
a stronger incentive to plead guilty. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court and commentators’ celebration of the defendant’s 
right to testify is premature. Empirical evidence on the state of defendant 
testimony paints a picture more deserving of lamentation than glee. The 
landscape is so gloomy that it supports the 19th-century critics who 
counterintuitively proclaimed that defendants are better off when prohibited 
from testifying at trial.201 The right to testify may, in fact, play a supporting 
role in some of the most troubling aspects of modern American criminal 
justice, including the proliferation of guilty pleas and the disproportionate 
imprisonment of racial minorities. 
The root of the problem is that the American criminal justice system has 
strayed from the presumption of innocence and the fabled insistence that “a 
defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the 
bar.”202 The data summarized above suggest that juries consider trial silence 
to be incriminating, and draw legally improper criminal character inferences 
from prior convictions admitted as “impeachment.” As a result, the only 
defendants who truly enjoy a presumption of innocence at trial are the 
relatively few defendants without admissible prior crimes who elect to testify. 
By contrast, the bulk of criminal defendants, particularly those with a prior 
 
 198. See Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior 
Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 551 (2009). 
 199. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371–72 (counting “blacks and Hispanics” as 
minority and excluding from both categories Asian defendants and those described as “other”). 
 200. See Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948 
to 2010, at 7 (unpublished manuscript), http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687. 
 201. A minority of defendants, approximately 31.5% of defendants in the NCSC data, 
unequivocally benefit from the venerated right. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 7, at 1371 tbl.1, 
1375 tbl.4 (the 31.5% percentage reported above consists of defendants with no record who 
testify (49) plus defendants with records who testify but the jury did not learn of their record 
(55) divided by total defendants (330)). 
 202. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).  
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record, face a choice between two damaging options, a choice they can only 
avoid by forgoing trial and pleading guilty. In essence, the venerated right to 
testify may primarily operate to push prior offenders quickly through the 
justice system by limiting the attractiveness of trial and thereby incentivizing 
guilty pleas. 
There are no easy solutions. A criminal justice system that relies on lay 
jurors will inevitably impose a “silence penalty” on defendants who refuse to 
testify.203 So long as American evidentiary rules simultaneously impose a 
“prior offender” penalty on defendants who do take the witness stand, these 
parallel penalties will predictably tilt the criminal justice scales toward 
conviction. 
The critical point is that, for all its accolades, the modern right to testify 
is not just a lofty principle. It is part of a complex web of legal rules that, while 
vulnerable to criticism, have proven stubbornly resistant to change.204 Under 
the sway of those rules, the right to testify appears to be broadly harming 
criminal defendants and undermining the criminal justice system itself. In 
that light, the Supreme Court’s claim that there could be “no rational 
justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused”205 seems 
profoundly out of touch. There is certainly a rational basis for prohibiting 
sworn defendant testimony. It can be found in the data that reflect the stark 
realities of our flawed criminal justice system. 
 
 
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
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